Companies must prepare staff as west African piracy grows – sector focus, piracy

There are two distinct threats to maritime security in west Africa and the Gulf of Guinea: product theft from tankers and kidnapping and ransom. These are two separate elements involving different gangs and groups that vary both in nature and modus operandi. The first element engages in an immense level of organisation. None of the attacks where cargo theft is involved is opportune. Vessels are targeted on a pre-sold basis and the process and the amount of people involved are significant. There is a very well organised machine behind these operations. These groups are mainly motivated by the capacity of their storage tanks and what they need, which is mostly refined products rather than crude oil. If the group’s reserves are getting low and they have notification of a vessel carrying that particular product transiting through their area of operation, then the vessel will get a visit.hideTheir intelligence is extremely good but most of the information that they require is open source, which means that they receive details of all ships arriving and the cargo they are carrying to each terminal in the Gulf of Guinea from commercial agents. These agents are under security and safety pressures and therefore tend to comply and disclose the right information and updates of when the vessels are arriving. Then, because there is a huge organisation that needs to be mobilised behind each illegal transfer or STS (ship-to-ship) operation, they are meticulously planned. There is a complex human intelligence matrix and profile involved and the gangs have a very clear understanding of it. The size of the gangs and information trail are immense. For each product tanker that is being ‘temporarily detained’, around 100 people are involved. It is exceptionally well organised and they never fail. On average, cargo theft happens once a quarter, possibly twice, depending on the internal requirements and how low their storage tanks are. Up until now each time a ship has been targeted, approximately 3000 tonnes of product have been transferred because that is the size of the attackers’ bunker barges. This is not a terrorist operation, it is a criminal commercial enterprise. Most concerning is that the more crews try to stop theft from happening—or shipping agents from passing on the right information—the more dangerous and violent it becomes, increasing the chances of innocent people being fatally wounded. Cargo is insured, life is not and crews need to be aware that, in these cases, the criminals are not after them, they are after the product. Cargo theft is likely to continue in the Gulf of Guinea and criminal organisations are now very keen to move outside of Nigerian waters because of increased security awareness. The second element, kidnapping and ransom, has seen a recent increase in the past 12 months as merchant shipping transiting through the Gulf of Guinea has not learnt the same lessons from the Indian Ocean. Radar watch keeping and visual security lookout appear to be exceptionally poor. Having a citadel and a plan is essential to safeguard crew members but this is not currently functioning as it should. If the Officer of the Watch (OOW) sees speedboats approaching the ship at 25kts, it is essential that they have a plan in place and know where each crew member is in order to get everyone safely to the citadel. However, in many cases this does not happen. There has to be a security routine because if criminals manage to get on board, crew that are on deck carrying out their daily tasks instead of being in the citadel are likely to be taken hostage and taken ashore. Unfortunately, there have been a couple of incidents involving mainly German flagged/owned container vessels where crews were taken hostage and ransom was paid straight away. This has set a precedent that is likely to spread like wildfire and will not be purely restricted to west Africa, possibly spreading to other areas like the Mediterranean within the next three to five years, following the growing political instability resulting from the Arab Spring. In short, the way forward to mitigate and reduce the risk of any personnel security concerns is primarily to concentrate on radar watch keeping and visual lookout for any suspicious activity. It is also essential that they have and rotate multiple watch keepers, even when in port, to maintain a high state of alertness. Moreover, vessels transiting through high-risk areas should also have an exceptional citadel, a well-trained crew and a very good security plan in place to respond rapidly in the event of an incident.

Companies must prepare staff as west African piracy grows – sector focus, piracy

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